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IVAN MARTINO
Abstract. In this manuscript, we define and study probabilistic values for cooperative games on
simplicial complexes. Inspired by the work of Weber [Web88], we establish the new theory step
by step, following the classical axiomatization, i.e. using the linearity axiom, the dummy axiom,
etc.
Furthermore, we define Shapley values on simplicial complexes generalizing the classical no-
tion in literature. Remarkably, the traditional axiomatization of Shapley values can be extended
to this general setting for a rather interesting class of complexes that generalize, in certain in-
stances, the notions of vertex-transitive graphs [AB16, RV76, Yao88] and vertex-homogeneous
simplicial complexes [Bjo¨95, KSS84, Lut02, Lut01, Wel99]. These combinatorial objects are
very popular in the literature because of the study of Evasiveness Conjecture in Complexity The-
ory [AB16, RV76, Yao88, Lut02, Lut01].
A cooperative game on [n] def= {1, . . . , n} is a characteristic function defined on all subsets
of [n], v : 2n → R with the restriction v(∅) = 0. In other words, n is the number of players
and v(T ) provides the worth of every coalition T ⊆ [n]. It is a very interesting problem to
determine an equitable distributions of the payoff of the grand coalition v([n]), see for instances
[Sha53, Sha72, Web88].
In the last decade, several research articles have considered cooperative games on different
combinatorial structures [BDJLL01, BDJLL02, MTMZ19, MZ11, FV11, NZKI97, Zha99]. In-
spired by these, the author has defined and studied cooperative games on simplicial complexes
[Mar20a] and he has developed the concept of efficiency for this new class of games [Mar20b].
In this manuscript, we define probabilistic values for cooperative games on simplicial com-
plexes. Influenced by the work of Weber [Web88], we establish the new theory step by step,
following the classical axiomatization, i.e. using the linearity axiom, the dummy axiom, etc.
Further, we define Shapley values on simplicial complexes generalizing the classical notion in
literature.
Remarkably, Shapley values can be only characterized for a rather interesting class of com-
plexes that generalize, in specific instances, the notions of vertex-transitive graphs [AB16, RV76,
Yao88] and vertex-homogeneous simplicial complexes [Bjo¨95, KSS84, Lut02, Lut01, Wel99].
These combinatorial objects are very important in the literature because of the study of Evasive-
ness Conjecture in Complexity Theory [AB16, RV76, Yao88, Lut02, Lut01].
Before proceeding with a detailed presentation of the new results, we are going to introduce
cooperative games on simplicial complexes and, right after, we will provide several motivation
for this work.
Games on simplicial complexes. Playing the game in the traditional setting, we assume that
each player may join every coalition. The main motivation for the generalization is that this may
not be allowed: there could be certain coalitions forbidden for very specific reasons. Once this
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(a) This simplicial complex is a ma-
troid.
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(b) This simplicial complex is not a
matroid.
Figure 1. Two examples of pure simplicial complexes.
is on the ground, one could also argue that if the coalition T is not allowed, then every other
coalition containing it will not be accepted too.
Simplicial complexes are combinatorial and topological objects that serve as coalition set for
these games because they respect the above consideration. Specifically, a simplicial complex is
a family ∆ of subsets of [n] closed under inclusion, that is if X ∈ ∆, then every subset Y ⊆ X
belongs also to ∆. There are several familiar examples: graphs, the boundary of simplicial
polytopes, and the full power set 2n are simplicial complex. In the latter case, ∆ = 2n is called a
(n − 1)-dimensional simplex.
A cooperative game on ∆ is defined by a characteristic function v:
v : ∆→ R
with the usual constrain that v(∅) = 0. Employing this notation, the game ([n], v) can be seen
as the cooperative game on the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex (2n, v), with the same characteristic
function v. So these cooperative games are the ones where every coalition is allowed.
As in the traditional case, the individual function φi(v) measures the additional value that the
playes i provides to a feasible coalition during the cooperative game (∆, v). The focus of this
work is the study of the individual values for the cooperative games where feasible coalition T
are defined to be elements of ∆.
It is worth to mention a few reasons why the generalization provided is relevant.
Probabilistic values for simplicial complexes. Matroids are at the intersection of Algebra,
Combinatorics, Geometry, and Topology. Since their introduction [Whi35], new variations have
appeared in literature encoding different type of independence [DM13, DM13, DW92, Mur96,
Rin12, Hir19, Mar18, BM19, FM19, BM20].
Several authors have already taken in consideration cooperative games on matroids [BDJLL01,
BDJLL02, MTMZ19, MZ11, FV11, NZKI97, Zha99]. Matroids are simplicial complexes ful-
filling the base exchange property, see for instance [Sta12, Sta96, Sta84, Oxl11]. As shown
in Figure 1, not every pure simplicial complex is a matroid: Figure 1a and 1b show two pure
simplicial complexes and only the one in the left is a matroid.
The author has introduces cooperative games on simplicial complexes in [Mar20a] and studied
quasi-probabilistic values introduced in [BDJLL01]. Inspired by [Web88], in this manuscript we
develop the theory for probabilistic values and in Section 2 and Section 3 we extend the results
of Weber [Web88, Section 3 and 4], by borrowing (from Combinatorial Topology) the notion of
link of a vertex.
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Shapley values. As anticipated, one of our goal is to define Shapley values for simplicial com-
plexes. A first tentative for this can be track back to Bilbao, Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and
Lebro´n [BDJLL01] for cooperative game on matroids. They study individual values that can be
written as weighted sum of classical Shapley values. The author has shown that this idea can be
generalized to pure simplicial complexes (i.e. every maximal element has the same cardinality)
but not further, see Theorem 5.2 of [Mar20a].
This restriction is kind of unwelcome, because Shapley values are tremendous objects for
this theory. Thus, in this work, we provide a natural definition of Shapley values for every
simplicial complex, including the not pure ones, see Section 6. On the other hand, the elegant
characterization, seen in Section 9 of [Web88], holds only for a specific class of complexes
having strong symmetry.
Players with different strategies. The request of symmetry for ∆ translates to players having
the same strategy constrains. The combinatorial and topological side of this phenomenon will
be exposed in the next paragraph, but here we highlight an observation relevant for the theory
of these games. In the traditional setting, players may have different point of view and attitude
to risk. In this new setting, players might also have different strategy constrains: since certain
coalitions are not allowed, different players could have completely different strategy to the game.
For instance, in the example in Figure 1b, the player 3 is the only one who may join two different
coalitions of cardinality three, the largest coalition possible for this game.
The Shapley complex. The Shapley values are characterized axiomatically only if the link of
every vertex of the simplicial complex has the same f -vector, say s; we call this complexes,
s-Shapley, see Section 6. This definition generalizes, in specific instances, the notion of vertex-
homogeneous complexes, that is a simplicial complex ∆ such that every pair of vertices i, j ∈ ∆,
there exists an automorphism g ∈ Aut(∆) such that g(i) = j, see more in Section 6 of [BM12].
We are not going to use this notion, but we want to remark that vertex-homogeneous simplicial
complexes are extremely useful in the study of non-evasiveness, used in Combinatorics and
combinatorial Geometry, and motivated by questions in Graph Theory [Bjo¨95, KSS84, Lut02,
Lut01, Wel99]. A very nice and well written introduction about simplicial complexes and the
evasiveness conjecture can be found here [AB16].
Machine-Learning prediction models and Multi-Touching Attribution. A ground-breaking
application of the Shapley value methodology is in the interpretability of the Machine-Learning
prediction models [LL17, RSG16, SK13, SPK17, DSZ16, BBM+15, LC01].
Last but not the least, another very important application is the multi-touch attribution sys-
tem in Marketing, for instance offered in marketing platform of . A prototype example
of the multi-touch attribution system in Marketing on simplicial complexes is provided in the
Introduction of [Mar20a].
Presentation of the new results
Our first observation is that the set of coalition, Coalitions∆ i, the player i can join is actually
a simplicial complex it-self. Indeed, we show in Proposition 2.1 that
Coalitions∆ i = Lk∆ i,
the link of the vertex i in ∆, see Definition 1.3.
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Then, we start our axiomatization of the individual values. Let us denote by R∆ the vector
space of cooperative games on the simplicial complex ∆, i.e. the set of all characteristic functions
under the constrain v(∅) = 0. If c is a real number, then the re-scaled game (n, c · v), given by
the characteristic function (c · v)(T ) = cv(T ) for every T ∈ ∆, should provide a re-scaled (by the
same constant) player assessments, and so a re-scaled individual values φi(c · v) = cφi(v).
We assume: the individual value φi is defined in a cone I of cooperative games in R∆.
The first requirement is that the φi are linear functions.
Linearity Axiom: The individual value φi(v) of the player i for the cooperative game (∆, v) is
linear on I.
It seems reasonable to think that the individual value φi(v) of the player i only depends on the
payoff v(T ) and v(T ∪ i) for every set T in the coalition set Coalitions∆ i. This is precisely the
content of our first statement. To appreciate the results, let us remember that the star of a player
i is, as a set, St∆ i
def
= {T,T ∪ i : T ∈ Coalitions∆ i}; this will be carefully defined in Definition 1.2.
Theorem A. Assume that the cone of cooperative games I contains the carrier games C and Cˆ
for every T ∈ ∆ but T ∪ i < ∆. If the individual value φi fulfills the linearity axiom, then, φi(v)
only depends on the value of v on the Star of i in ∆, St∆ i, that is
φi(v) =
∑
T∈St∆ i
aT v(T ).
The set of coefficients {aT } is unique.
Assume that a player does contribute the same specific amount v(i), the number of payoff s/he
can reach by himself, to every coalition: such player is traditionally called dummy, because s/he
has no strategy, not matter what coalition s/he joins. Then, the next axiom imposes that her/his
retribution should be precisely v(i).
Dummy Player Axiom: If a player i is dummy for the cooperative game (∆, v), then its individ-
ual value φi(v) is v(i).
This axiom gives the very traditional formula expressing φi(v) in terms of the marginal contribu-
tions (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )):
Theorem B. Assume that the cone of cooperative games I contains the carrier games C for
Lk∆ i. If the individual value φi can be written as in equation (2) and satisfies the dummy player
axiom, then there exist real numbers {pT }T∈LkS i such that∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT = 1
and for every v in I
() φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
Next, we want to deal with monotone functions: v : ∆ → R such that for every S ⊆ T ∈ ∆,
then v(S ) ≤ v(T ). If v is a monotone function, then every marginal contribution is positive,
because v(T ∪ i) ≥ v(T ). Hence, every player will require a positive retribution.
Monotonicity Axiom: If v is a monotone game, then φi(v) ≥ 0 for every player i.
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Using Theorem B or, more generically, if the individual value can be written as in equation
(), one can immediately show that the real constants {pT }T∈Lk∆ i are actually a probability dis-
tribution on the elements of Lk∆ i.
Theorem C. Assume that the cone of cooperative games I contains the carrier games C and Cˆ
for St∆ i. We assume that the individual value φi can written as in equation (), that
∑
T∈Lk∆ i pT =
1, and that it fulfills the monotonicity axiom. Then, the constants {pT }T∈Lk∆ i are a probability
distribution.
With these results in mind, a probabilistic value defined on the cone I of cooperative games
on a simplicial complex ∆ is the linear function φi written in the form () such that {pT }T∈Lk∆ i
is a probability distribution on the elements of link of the vertex i.
In [Mar20a], with a different probabilistic flavor, the author has shown similar results but
distinct from the one in Theorem A, B and C. Aside that the style of proof differs and that the
tools used are diverse (for instance, in [Mar20a] the author borrow the λi-dummy axiom from
[BDJLL01]), the main goal of [Mar20a] is studying when a quasi-probabilistic value can be
written as sum of traditional Shapley values.
Up to this achievement, everything somehow follows the path shown in [Web88]. The two
theories parts introducing the symmetric axiom. We start by recalling that a group value φ
for the cooperative game (∆, v) is the vector (φ1(v), . . . , φn(v)), collecting all individual player
values.
We denote by Symm(∆) the largest subgroup of the symmetric group S n such that if T ∈ ∆ and
if g ∈ Symm(∆), then piT ∈ ∆. Moreover, pi · v stands for the permuted characteristic function;
this is (pi · v) : ∆→ R such that
pi · v(T ) = v(piT ).
Symmetry Axiom: Assume that for every permutation pi in Symm(∆) we have that pi · v belongs
to I. Let φ be a group value for the cooperative game (∆, v). Then, φi(v) = φpii(pi · v), for
every pi in Symm(∆).
Some of the symmetries in S n have a key role in the theory. We define piiL,T to the permutation
that switches two set L and T of the same cardinality in Lk∆ i and fixes i. We denote by pii, j the
simple transposition (i, j). In Definition 5.2, we denote by pi(∆) the subgroup of S n generated
by the permutation piiL,T for all i and for all L,T ∈ Lk∆ i with |L| = |T | and generated by every
transposition pii, j provided that Lk∆ i ∩ Lk∆ j , ∅.
In our first analysis in Theorem 5.3, we are able to show that the symmetric axiom implies that
the probability pT for every non-trivial coalition T actually depends only on the cardinality of T .
On the other hand, in Section 5.6 and Section 5.8, we explain that if we assume the symmetric
axiom, then without loss of generality we may work with simplicial complexes with pure links
Lk∆ i or rank r − 1. We shortly call these complexes as simplicial complex with pure links, see
Definition 5.7.
To present the next result it is necessary the notion of f -vector of a simplicial complex: this
is the vector of integers f(∆) = (f−1(∆), . . . , fr−1(∆)) that encodes the number of elements of a
specific cardinality, that is
fi(∆)
def
= |{S ∈ ∆, #S = i + 1}|.
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For instance, f−1(∆) = 1, because the empty set always belongs to any non-empty simplicial
complex and, if the complex is pure of rank r, then fr−1(∆) gives the number of facets of ∆, that
is the cardinality of Ft ∆, see Section 1.
Theorem D. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex of rank r with pure links and let I be a cone of
cooperative games defined on ∆, containing the carrier games C and Cˆ for the star St∆ i for
every vertex i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also in I for every pi in
Symm(∆). Let φ be a group value such that for each i ∈ [n] and for each v ∈ I, we can write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
If pi(∆) ⊆ Symm(∆) and if φ satisfies the symmetric axiom, then there are real constants pt
with t , 0, . . . , rank ∆ − 1 such that for every players i and every non-trivial T ∈ Lk∆ i one has
piT = p|T |.
Moreover, there exists a common value p0 for the probabilities pi∅ if p = (p0, p1, . . . , pr−1) is
the solution of the following system of n linear equations:
f(Lk∆ 1) · p = 1,
f(Lk∆ 2) · p = 1,
...
f(Lk∆ n) · p = 1,
where each equation has form
∑r−1
k=0 fk−1(Lk∆ i)pk = 1.
In Theorem 5.15, we show that if ∆ is a Shapley simplicial complex, then the previous linear
system has at least a solution.
The Shapley values are probabilistic values for the cooperative game (2[n], v) where the pT ’s
are set following that every player joins coalitions of different sizes with the same probability
and all coalitions of the same size are equally likely. Using this recipe, we define the Shapley
values for every simplicial complex ∆. We note that the coalition may have cardinality among
0 ≤ k ≤ ri def= rank Lk∆ i and the number of coalitions of a specific cardinality k is encoded by the
(k − 1) − th component of the f -vector of Lk∆ i:
(?) Shapley∆i (v) =
1
ri + 1
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
1
f |T |−1(Lk∆ i)
(v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
In the traditional case, ∆ is a simplex, f|T |−1 = |T |!(n−|T |−1)!(n−1)! , and ri + 1 = n; so:
Shapleyi(v) =
∑
T⊆[n]\i
1
n
|T |!(n − |T | − 1)!
(n − 1)! (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
With this specifics (∆ = 2n), these individual values are characterized by the following theorem:
Shapley’s Theorem [Web88]. Let ∆ = 2[n] and let I be a cone of cooperative games containing
the carrier games C and Cˆ for N \ i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also
in I for every permutation pi of [n].
Let φ be a group value. If each φi satisfies the linearity axiom, the dummy player axiom,
and if the symmetric axiom and the efficiency axiom hold for the group value φ, then for every
6
cooperative game in I and every i in [n],
φi(v) = Shapleyi(v).
As highlighted with bold text, we did not treat, yet, a piece of the axiomatization: the effi-
ciency. The group value φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn) assessment is optimistic (w. r. to v) if the sum of the
payoff vector
∑
i φi(v) is greater than the v([n]), the worth of the grand coalition. If the contrary
happens, then φ is pessimistic (w. r. to v). The classical Shapley values are characterized by
group values that are nor optimistic or pessimistic, that is
∑
i φi(v) = v([n]).
If certain coalitions are forbidden, so the grand coalition would be. Thus, it is necessary to
study what could take the place of the the total number of payoff, that in the traditional case is
simply to v([n]). This study is the center of attention of the manuscript [Mar20b].
The proposed characterization of the Shapley values for cooperative games on simplicial com-
plex used a different efficiency scenario. To present it, we need the following objects: we define
a player j to be an extension for the coalition T if j can join T in the cooperative game:
Ext(T ) = { j ∈ [n] \ T : T ∪ j ∈ ∆};
The cardinality of this set is denoted by ext(T ) = |Ext(T )|.
Theorem E (Generalized Shapley’s Theorem). Let ∆ be a simplicial complex of rank r with pure
links and let I be a cone of cooperative games on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ for
the star St∆ i for every vertex i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also in I
for every permutation pi in Symm(∆).
Let φ be a group value and assume that each φi satisfies the linearity axiom, the dummy
player axiom. Assume also that the group value fulfills the symmetric axiom with the further
constrain that every player enters the games with probability p0, that is there exists a solution
p = (p0, p1, . . . , pr−1) for the linear system n equations:
f(Lk∆ 1) · p = 1,
f(Lk∆ 2) · p = 1,
...
f(Lk∆ n) · p = 1,
where each equation has the form in
∑r−1
k=0 fk−1(Lk∆ i)pk = 1.
Then, every individual value is the Shapley value in equation (?) if and only if ∆ is s-Shapley
with s = (s0, . . . , sr−1) and the group value satisfies the following efficiency scenario:∑
i∈[n]
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Ft ∆
(
1
sr−1
)
v(F) +
1
r
∑
T∈∆,|T |<r
( |T |
s|T |−1
− ext(T )
s|T |
)
v(T ).
The efficiency constrain may seem artificial, but so it is any efficient condition, as Weber
pointed out in Section 8 of [Web88].
Finally, in Theorem 7.3, we link this new definition with the development in [BDJLL01,
BDJLL02, Mar20a], by finding the extra condition for writing Shapley∆i as sum of classical
Shapley values.
Acknowledgments. The author is currently supported by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foun-
dation and by the Royal Swedish Academy of Science.
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1. Basic Definitions
For every positive integer n, we denote by [n] def= {1, . . . , n}. This is the set of verticies of the
simplicial complex and, hence, the set of players of the cooperative game.
1.1. Simplicial Complexes. A finite simplicial complex ∆ over n verticies is a family of subsets
in 2[n] such that if S ∈ ∆, then very subset T of S will also belong to the family, T ∈ ∆. We say
that a simplicial complex is non empty if ∆ , ∅ and, if this is the case ∅ ∈ ∆ because the empty
set is always a subset for every S ∈ ∆.
The family ∆ has natural a rank function rk given by the cardinality of its sets:
rk : ∆ → N
T 7→ |T |.
The elements of ∆ that are maximal by inclusions are called facets, the other ones are faces. The
maximal value of the rank function is the rank of the simplicial complex rk ∆. The set of facets
of ∆ is Ft ∆ = {F1, . . . , Fk} and for every S ∈ ∆ let Ft∆ S be the set of facets in ∆ that contain S .
In this manuscript, we assume that ∆ is always a finite non-empty simplicial complex over n
verticies of rank r def= rk ∆.
If S is an element in ∆, then S¯ def= 2S is the (|S | − 1)-dimensional simplex defined on the
verticies of S . The next two definitions are very important for this work.
Definition 1.2. The star of an element S in ∆ is the simplicial complex defined to be the collec-
tion of all subset in T¯ with T being in ∆ and containing S ,
St∆ S = {A : A ∈ T¯ , T ∈ ∆, S ⊆ T }.
We highlight when S = {i} is a vertex, then St∆ i is the set of simplex T¯ containing i, that is
St∆ i = {A : A ⊆ T, i ∈ T ∈ ∆}.
Definition 1.3. The link of an element S in a simplicial complex ∆ is made by the subsets A of
T ∈ ∆, such that T is disjoint by S and can be completed by S , S ∪ T , in ∆:
Lk∆ S = {A : A ∈ T¯ with T ∈ ∆ such that S ∩ T = ∅, S ∪ T ∈ ∆}.
The case when S is the singleton {i} will be extremely relevant in our work: Lk∆ i is the set of
simplex T in ∆ with i < T such that T ∪ i ∈ ∆:
Lk∆ i = {T ∈ ∆ : i < T and T ∪ i ∈ ∆}.
The f -vector of a simplicial complex is a integral vector f(∆) = (f−1(∆), . . . , fr−1(∆)) where
(1) fi(∆)
def
= #{S ∈ ∆, #S = i + 1}.
If ∆ , ∅, then the empty set belongs to the complex and, thus, f−1(∆) = 1. Just to give a concrete
example, if ∆ is a the full simplex on n verticies, ∆ = 2[n], then fi(∆) =
(
n
i+1
)
.
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1.4. Cooperative games on simplicial complexes. A cooperative game on a simplicial com-
plex ∆ is the pair (∆, v) where v is a characteristic function v : ∆→ R with v(∅) = 0. This notion
has been defined in [Mar20a], where the author generalizes the notion of cooperative game on
matroids given by Bilbao, Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n [BDJLL01].
The verticies of ∆ are the players of the cooperative game and a coalition T is feasible if
T ∈ ∆. The set R∆ of characteristic functions on ∆ is a real vector space, similarly as in the
traditional setting. Indeed, given (∆, v), one can re-scale the characteristic function with a scalar
c and obtain a new cooperative game (∆, cv), where (cv)(T ) = c(v(T )) for every subset T ∈ ∆.
Each individual value φi(v) should assesses the worth of the participation of the player i in to
the game. Of course, we are looking for values such that φi(cv) = cφi(v), because the worth of
each player is just re-scaled. For this reason, we consider a cone I of cooperative game in R∆.
Definition 1.5. An individual value for a player i in [n] is a function φi : I→ R.
1.6. Carrier games. There are two types of cooperative games having an central role in the
theory of probalistic values [Web88]. Despite in literature this terminology often refer to the
first one, we are going to called the following carrier games:
C = {vT : ∅ , T ⊂ [n]}, Cˆ = {vˆT : ∅ , T ⊂ [n]},
where vT and vˆT are so defined:
vT (S ) =
1 T ⊆ S0 otherwise. , vˆT (S ) =
1 T ( S0 otherwise.
We generalize these games for any element T of a simplicial complex. Indeed for every partially
order set (P,≤P) and every element q in P we consider the following function:
uPq (s)
def
=
1 q ≤P s0 otherwise. , uˆPq (s) def=
1 q <P s0 otherwise.
Thus, we define
vT (S )
def
= u∆T (S ), vˆT (S )
def
= uˆ∆T (S ).
In the traditional setting, these functions reproduce the carrier games.
Definition 1.7. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex. The sets of carrier games are so defined:
C = {vT : ∅ , T ∈ ∆}, Cˆ = {vˆT : ∅ , T ∈ ∆},
where vT (S )
def
= u∆T (S ) and vˆT (S )
def
= uˆ∆T (S ); moreover, vˆ∅
def
= uˆ∆∅ .
In almost all of the main results in this manuscript we need to require that certain carrier
games belong to I. In particular, we are going to write ”Assume that the cone of cooperative
games I contains the carrier games C and Cˆ for St∆ i.” and we mean that both vT and vˆT belong
to I for all T ∈ St∆ i.
2. Coalitions Set and Linearity Axiom
Before even starting with the axiomatization of the probabilistic values, we want to devote a
few paragraphs to study the set of coalitions that a player i may join in the game.
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Let (∆, v) be a cooperative game on a simplicial complex. The coalition set Coalitions∆ i is the
set of feasible coalitions that the player i can join in the game. Coalitions∆ i is defined as a set,
but in the next proposition we show it is a simplicial complex.
Proposition 2.1. The coalition set Coalitions∆ i is a simplicial complex. Precisely:
Coalitions∆ i = Lk∆ i.
Proof. The statement follows naturally by definition of link. 
In other words, the previous statement shows that the coalition set does only depends on the
simplicial complex ∆, i.e. it is independent by the characteristic function v.
Now, given a (positive) real scalar c, we may also consider the re-scaled game (n, c · v) given
by the characteristic function (c · v)(T ) = cv(T ) for every T ∈ ∆. Since in this new game, the
worth of every coalition has been only re-scaled, it is natural that the new individual value φi(c·v)
would also be re-scaled by c, φi(c · v) = cφi(v).
From now on: we assume that the individual value function is defined in a cone I of cooperative
games in the vector space R∆.
The first classical requirement is that the individual values are linear functions.
Linearity Axiom: The individual value function φi(v) of the player i for the cooperative game
(∆, v) is linear on the cone I.
At this stage, it is worth to provide an interpretation for St∆ i. This is in fact the completed set
of coalitions for the player i, that is the set of coalition T the player i can join together with the
formed coalitions T ∪ i.
It is reasonable to that the individual value φi(v) only depends on values of the characteristic
function v on for the coalitions in St∆ i. This is precisely the content of the next theorem.
Theorem A. Assume that the cone of cooperative games I contains the carrier games C and Cˆ
for every T ∈ ∆ but T ∪ i < ∆. If the individual value φi fulfills the linearity axiom, then, φi(v)
only depends on the value of v on the Star of i in ∆, St∆ i, that is
(2) φi(v) =
∑
T∈St∆ i
aT v(T ).
The set of coefficients {aT } is unique.
Proof. Since the function φi is linear, then φi(v) =
∑
T∈∆ aT v(T ) and the coefficients aT are
unique.
We need to prove that aT is zero if T is not a set in St∆ i. Specifically, we want to show that
aT is zero if T ∈ ∆ but T ∪ i < ∆. Let 1T be the indicator function of the set T in ∆, that is:
1T (S )
def
=
1 T = S ∈ ∆0 otherwise. .
Since the carrier games belong to I, then we write the indicator functions as 1T = vT − vˆT .
We note that φi(1T ) = aT v(T ) and then φi(1T ) = φi(vT − vˆT ) = aT v(T ) = 0 if T ∪ i < ∆. This is
because φi(vˆT ) = 1T∪iv(T ∪ i) and because φi(vT ) = vT (i) = 0. 
For now, it is convenient to rewrite φi(v) in (2) as
(3) φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
aT v(T ) +
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
aT∪iv(T ∪ i).
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3. Dummy Player Axiom
The next natural condition we want to assume is that if a player does contribute the same
specific amount v(i) to every coalition, then her/his retribution should be precisely v(i), that is the
number of payoff he can reach by her/himself. Such player is traditionally called dummy, because
he has no strategy, not matter what coalition he joins. This is the mathematical description of
this phenomenon.
A player i is dummy for v if for every set T in the coalition set Coalitions∆ i one has
v(T ∪ i) = v(T ) + v(i).
We are ready to state the so called dummy axiom:
Dummy Player Axiom: If a player i is dummy for the cooperative game (∆, v), then its indi-
vidual value φi(v) is precisely v(i).
This axiom is a strong condition on the individual value and indeed provides the very traditional
formula expressing φi(v) in terms of the marginal contributions (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
Theorem B. Assume that the cone of cooperative games I contains the carrier games C for
Lk∆ i. If the individual value φi can be written as in equation (2) and satisfies the dummy player
axiom, then there exist real numbers {pT }T∈LkS i such that∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT = 1
and for every v in I
(4) φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
Proof. The structure of the proof follows similar as the one of Theorem 2 in [Web88] but since
there are several mathematical difference we write it here in details.
We start by showing the second statement. First, we observe that for any nonempty T ∈ Lk∆ i,
the player i is dummy for the carrier game vT ; moreover φi(vT ) = vT (i) = 0, by definition of the
game vT .
Now consider a facet F(0) in Lk∆ i and let us compute φi(vF(0)). Since F(0) ∪ i is also a facet
for ∆, one gets that φi(vF(0)) = aF(0) + aF(0)∪i. In addition, aF(0) + aF(0)∪i = 0 because i is a dummy
player for the carrier game vF(0) .
Let us assume that φi(vF( j)) = aF( j) + aF( j)∪i = 0 for all face F( j) of co-rank j less or equal to k in
Lk∆ i and let us prove that aF(k+1) + aF(k+1)∪i = 0 for every face F(k+1) of co-rank k + 1. Indeed, by
definition of vF(k+1) we have that φi(vF(k+1)) =
∑
T⊇F(k+1),T∈St∆ i aT . This is equal to
k+1∑
j=0
∑
K
aK
Where the second sum runs over the set K ∈ St∆ i of co-rank j, containing F(k+1), K ⊇ F(k+1).
We then isolate the term aF(k+1) + aF(k+1)∪i
aF(k+1) + aF(k+1)∪i +
k∑
j=0
∑
T ′
aT ′ ,
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and, by induction, the sum
∑k
j=0
∑
T ′ aT ′ splits like
∑k
j=0
∑
T (aT + aT∪i) and where T runs over
the set T ∈ Lk∆ i of co-rank j, containing F(k+1). Hence ∑kj=0 ∑T (aT + aT∪i) = 0 and conse-
quently, φi(vF(k+1)) = aF(k+1) + aF(k+1)∪i = 0.
To conclude the proof of the second statement, it remains to denote for every T in Lk∆ i
pT
def
= aT∪i = −aT .
To prove the first part, instead, consider the carrier game vi in Lk∆ i and observe that i is a
dummy player in this game, so
φi(vi) = vi(i) = 1.
Using (4), that we have just proved, one has
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT = 1.

Remark 3.1. There is no restriction on the real number pT , so a-priory, pT may also be negative.
Remark 3.2. It is worth to clarify our notation in the case T = ∅: p∅ = ai = −a∅.
4. Monotonicity Axiom
The third classical condition required for an individual axiom is the monotonicity. This deals
with a class of very special functions on the simplicial complex, the monotone functions: v :
∆→ R such that for every S ⊆ T ∈ ∆, then v(S ) ≤ v(T ).
Monotonicity Axiom: If v is a monotone game, then φi(v) ≥ 0 for each player i.
In other words, if v is a monotone function, the player i knows that his marginal contribution
to the game in every coalition will be always positive, that is v(T ∪ i) ≥ v(T ). Thus, the player is
going to require a positive retribution.
In view of what we have just proven in Theorem B, or by assuming that the individual value
φi can written as in equation (4), we immediately show that the real constants {pT }T∈Lk∆ i are
actually always non-negative and, hence, they are a probability distribution on the elements of
Lk∆ i.
Theorem C. Assume that the cone of cooperative games I contains the carrier games C and Cˆ
for St∆ i. We assume that the individual value φi can written as in equation (4), that
∑
T∈Lk∆ i pT =
1, and that it fulfills the monotonicity axiom. Then, the constants {pT }T∈Lk∆ i are a probability
distribution.
Proof. The the game vˆT is monotone for all T ∈ St∆ i. Then φi(vˆT ) = pT ≥ 0. 
We close this section by giving the main definition of this work.
Definition 4.1. Given a cone I in the vector space R∆ of cooperative games on a simplicial com-
plex ∆. A probabilistic value is a linear function φi written in the form (4) such that {pT }T∈Lk∆ i
is a probability distribution on the elements of link of the vertex i.
Of course, Theorem A, Theorem B and Theorem C provides all together a characterization for
probabilistic values on the simplicial complex ∆. One only needs to take care of all the requested
carrier games in I.
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5. Group value and Symmetry Axiom
To move forward in generalizing the classical theory for probabilistic values, we now intro-
duce the notion of group value, the collection of the individual value functions for all players in
the game. In other words:
Definition 5.1. A group value φ for the cooperative game (∆, v) is the vector (φ1(v), . . . , φn(v)).
To introduce the next requirement we need a further step. Consider the subgroup Symm(∆)
of the symmetric group S n made by the permutations such that if T ∈ ∆, then piT ∈ ∆. Finally,
let us denote by pi · v the permuted characteristic function; this is (pi · v) : ∆→ R such that
pi · v(T ) = v(piT ).
We denote by piiL,T the permutation that switches two set L and T of the same cardinality in
Lk∆ i and fixes i. We define pii, j to be the simple transposition (i, j).
Symmetry Axiom: Assume that for every permutation pi in Symm(∆) we have pi · v belongs to
I. Let φ be a group value for the cooperative game (∆, v). Then, φi(v) = φpii(pi · v), for
every pi in Symm(∆).
Some of the symmetries in S n have a specific role in next proof. Let us recall them here.
Definition 5.2. Let pi(∆) be the subgroup of S n generated by the permutation piiL,T for all i
and for all L,T ∈ Lk∆ i with |L| = |T | and generated by every transposition pii, j provided that
Lk∆ i ∩ Lk∆ j , ∅.
Theorem 5.3. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let I be a cone of games defined on ∆, con-
taining the carrier games C and Cˆ for Lk∆ i for every vertex i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the
permuted game pi · v is also in I for every pi in Symm(∆).
Let φ be a group value such that for each i ∈ [n] and for each v ∈ I, we can write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
If pi(∆) ⊆ Symm(∆) and if φ satisfies the symmetric axiom, then there are real constants pt with
t , 0, . . . , rank ∆ − 1 such that for all players i and all non-trivial T ∈ Lk∆ i one has piT = p|T |.
Proof. We first note that the rank of Lk∆ i is at most (but not necessarily the same) rank ∆ − 1.
Fix i and pick two non-trivial sets (but not facets) L and T of the same cardinality in Lk∆ i.
From the hypothesis piiL,T ∈ Symm(∆) and then, because of the symmetry axiom, piT = φi(vˆT ) =
φi(piiL,T · vˆT ) = φi(vˆL) = piL.
Now, for every i and consider two facets F and F′ of the same cardinality in Lk∆ i. One
has piiF,F′ ∈ Symm(∆) and because of the S.A we get, piF = φi(vF∪i) = φpiiF,F′ (i)(pi
i
F,F′ · vF∪i) =
φi(vF′∪i) = piF′ .
Finally, consider two distinct player i and j and pick T in Lk∆ i∩Lk∆ i. Then, the transposition
pii, j = (i, j) belongs to Symm(∆) and we obtain piT = φi(vˆT ) = φpii, j=(i)(pii, j·vˆT ) = φ j(vˆT ) = p jT . 
Remark 5.4. We could have request less carrier games in the cone I: specifically we only needs
that the carrier games in Cˆ belongs to I for every non-facets in the intersection of two links and
for every non-facet T in the link with at least another element of the same cardinality (in the
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same link). We also need that the carrier games in C for every facet in the link with at least
another facet of the same cardinality (in the same link).
The requests of the theorem are stronger because we aim to simplify the hypothesis.
Remark 5.5. We observe that a priori such constants pt could be also negative, but if we work
with monotone games then we get as well that the pt’s are non-negative.
As harmless as it could seem, passing from the symmetric group S n to the subgroup of sym-
metries Symm(∆) leads us already to requiring that a specific set of symmetries pi(∆) belong to
Symm(∆). A more careful look at the last paragraph of the previous proof highlights that the
consequences are drastically stronger than in the traditional case. In the next section we are
going to deal with this issue, together with the problem of assigning a common value p0 for the
probability pi∅ of every player.
5.6. Simplicial complex having pure links. Let us analyze the implications of Theorem 5.3.
Assume that all the hypothesis of the previous theorem are satisfied and that for two distinct
players i and j the rank of Lk∆ i is strictly smaller than the rank of Lk∆ j, say ri < r j. Then,
Theorem 5.3 says that p jT has to be zero for any subset of cardinality larger than ri. Indeed there
exist a common value p|T | for all probabilities p jT of j joining a cardinality |T | subset T . In facts,
there are no subsets of cardinality |T | > ri in Lk∆ i, because of the rank restriction. Thus, p|T | = 0
seen from the point of view of i.
In other words, the symmetry axiom implies that the strategy constrains are shared among all
players: in particular the probability of joining a certain coalition of size |T | has to be shared to;
If for a player there is no chance of joining a certain coalition of cardinality |T |, so it must be
also for the other players.
Now, the theory we develop allows p jT = 0 even in the case that T is a feasible coalition.
On the other hand, in this specific case, if p jT = 0, for all subsets of cardinality strictly larger
than k, then one can simply reconsider the same cooperative game defined on the k-skeleton of
simplicial complex ∆, that is ∆〈k〉 def= {S ∈ ∆ : |S | ≤ k}.
Therefore, we are not losing any generality if we assume the symmetry axiom and we work
with simplicial complexes having pure links:
Definition 5.7. A simplicial complex ∆ of rank r has pure links if the link of every vertex i,
Lk∆ i, is pure of rank r − 1.
5.8. Solving a linear system. We need to carry this analysis further to answer: is there a com-
mon value p0 for the probabilities pi∅? As done in the end of the proof of Theorem B, consider
the carrier game vi in St∆ i and observe that i is a dummy player in this game, so
φi(vi) = vi(i) = 1.
Using (4), that is also an hypothesis in Theorem 5.3, one has
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
pT = 1.
So for every i,
pi∅ = 1 −
∑
∅,T∈Lk∆ i
piT .
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For what we have just proven in Theorem 5.3, the previous equation becomes
pi∅ = 1 −
∑
∅,T∈Lk∆ i
p|T |.
Keeping track of the cardinality of T and using the f -vector notation, see equation (1), we obtain
pi∅ = 1 −
rk Lk∆ i∑
j=0
f j−1(Lk∆ i)p j
Recalling that f−1(Lk∆ i) = 1, see Section 1, and imposing that all pi∅ are equal to p0, we finally
get
(5)
rk Lk∆ i∑
k=0
fk−1(Lk∆ i)pk = 1.
Finally we assume that we work with a simplicial complex of rank r with pure links, see Defini-
tion 5.7, and we finally get
(6)
r−1∑
k=0
fk−1(Lk∆ i)pk = 1.
Because of the labeling shift, it is more elegant to write this in the scalar product form
f(Lk∆ i) · p = 1.
Theorem D. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex of rank r with pure links and let I be a cone of
cooperative games defined on ∆, containing the carrier games C and Cˆ for the star St∆ i for
every vertex i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also in I for every pi in
Symm(∆). Let φ be a group value such that for each i ∈ [n] and for each v ∈ I, we can write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
If pi(∆) ⊆ Symm(∆) and if φ satisfies the symmetric axiom, then there are real constants pt
with t , 0, . . . , rank ∆ − 1 such that for every players i and every non-trivial T ∈ Lk∆ i one has
piT = p|T |.
Moreover, there exists a common value p0 for the probabilities pi∅ if p = (p0, p1, . . . , pr−1) is
the solution of the following system of n linear equations:
(7)

f(Lk∆ 1) · p = 1,
f(Lk∆ 2) · p = 1,
...
f(Lk∆ n) · p = 1,
where each equation has the form in (6).
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5.9. The Shapley complexes. The first thing to observe is that many of the equations in (7) are
actually the same. This is a side effect of the hypothesis pi(∆) ⊆ Symm(∆).
Proposition 5.10. Let the transposition pii, j belong to Symm(∆) if Lk∆ i∩Lk∆ j , ∅. Then Lk∆ i
is isomorphic to Lk∆ j. Moreover, f(Lk∆ i) = f(Lk∆ j).
Proof. A face T belongs to Lk∆ i if and only if T ∪ i ∈ ∆ and i < T . Note (i, j)T = T and
(i, j)T ∪ i = T ∪ j. Moreover, if j ∈ T and S = (T ∪ i) \ j, then (i, j)T = S and, of course,
(i, j)S = T .
Thus the isomorphism in the statement is φ(i, j) induced by (i, j):
φ(i, j) : Lk∆ i → Lk∆ j
T 7→
T if j < T(T ∪ i) \ j if j ∈ T .

If the simplicial complex has enough faces then it may very well happen that several links
intersect and we obtain that all f(Lk∆ i) are actually the same. This is anyhow the case we are
interested. Indeed we would like to understand the class of simplicial complex such that the
system of equation in (7) has at least a solution.
Definition 5.11. A simplicial complex ∆ of rank r on n verticies is Shapley of vector s =
(s0, . . . , sr−1), if f(Lk∆ i) = s for every vertex i.
Example 5.12. The full simplex on n verticies ∆ = 2[n] is Shapley of vector s, with si =
(
n
i
)
for
i = 0, . . . , n − 1.
Example 5.13. The boundary of a simplex on n verticies ∆ = ∂(2[n]) is Shapley of vector s, with
si =
(
n
i
)
, for i = 0, . . . , n − 2. Similarly, ∆〈k〉 is a Shapley complex of vector
((
n
0
)
,
(
n
1
)
, . . . ,
(
n
k−1
))
.
Example 5.14. Let G be a graph on n verticies, then the f -vector of each links reduce to only
one non-trivial information: the number of edges to the selected vertex. Thus, G is Shapley of
vector (1, s) if and only if G is s-regular.
Ee can ensure the existence of at least a solution of the system (7) for Shapley simplicial
complexes.
Theorem 5.15. Let ∆ be a Shapley simplicial complex of vector s = (s0, . . . , sr−1) and and let
I be a cone of games defined on ∆, containing the carrier games C and Cˆ for the star St∆ i for
every player i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also in I for every pi in
Symm(∆).
Let φ be a group value such that for each i ∈ [n] and for each v ∈ I, we can write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
If pi(∆) ⊆ Symm(∆) and if φ satisfies symmetric axiom, then there are real constants pt with
t = 0, . . . , r − 1 such that piT = p|T | for all players i and all T ∈ Lk∆ i.
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Proof. We only need to provide a solution for the system (7), that for Shapley complexes is made
of only one equation. A solution is:
pk =
1
r
1
sk
.

6. The efficiency axiom and the Shapley value
The Shapley values are probabilistic values for the cooperative game (2[n], v) arising from the
following point of view:
• The player i joins a coalitions of different sizes with the same probability;
• All coalitions of the same size are equally likely.
Thus, the player has n possibilities to choose the size of a coalition (the joint coalitions may have
cardinality k = 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1) and, further, there are
(
n−1
k
)
choices among all sets (coalitions) of
cardinality k among the set of other players [n] \ i. Therefore, one defines the Shapley values for
the player i as
(8) Shapleyi(v) =
∑
T⊆[n]\i
1
n
|T |!(n − |T | − 1)!
(n − 1)! (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
To state the classical Shapley Theorem, we need to introduce the last requirement: efficiency.
The individual value φi associated to a cooperative game (2[n], v) measures the contribution of
the player i in the game. We have collected such values all together in the group value φ =
(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn). The assessment is optimistic (w. r. to v) if the sum of the payoff vector
∑
i φi(v)
is greater than the v([n]), the worth of the grand coalition. If the contrary happens, then φ is
pessimistic (w. r. to v). We are interesting in group values that are nor optimistic or pessimistic.
Efficiency Axiom: Let φ be a group value for the cooperative game (2[n], v) in the cone I. For
every cooperative game (2[n], v) in I, one has
∑n
i=1 φi(v) = v([n]).
Despite this axiom might seem artificial, this is the missing piece to characterize the Shapley
values in the traditional setting.
Shapley’s Theorem [Web88]. Let ∆ = 2[n] and let I be a cone of cooperative games containing
the carrier games C and Cˆ for N \ i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also
in I for every permutation pi of [n].
Let φ be a group value. If each φi satisfies the linearity axiom, the dummy player axiom
and if the symmetric axiom and the efficiency axiom hold for the group value φ, then for every
cooperative game in I and every i in [n],
φi(v) = Shapleyi(v).
If ∆ is not the full simplex, then the the grand coalition [n] is a forbidden coalition and, thus,
one needs to study what could take the place of the the total number of payoff v∆ = v([n]). This
study is the center of attention of the manuscript [Mar20b] and for what concerns us, we only
need to recall Theorem 2.1 of [Mar20b].
Theorem 6.1 (Theorem 2.1 of [Mar20b]). Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let I be a cone of
cooperative games defined on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ for ∆.
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Let φ be a group value on I such that for each i ∈ [n] and assume that for each v ∈ I, we can
write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
The group value φ satisfies ∑
i∈[n]
φi(v) =
∑
T∈∆
aT v(T )
if and only if for all non-facet T in ∆∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Lk∆ j
p jT = aT ,
and for every facet F of ∆ ∑
i∈F
piF\i = aF .
6.2. The Shapley values for simplicial complexes. Following the same probabilistic argument
we can easily generalize the Shapley value to every simplicial complex ∆ by observing that,
under the same prospective:
• coalitions may have cardinality k, 0 ≤ k ≤ ri def= rank Lk∆ i;
• the f -vector component fk−1(Lk∆ i) provides the number of faces of a specific cardinality
k, see (1).
Hence, we define the Shapley value for the cooperative game v on a simplicial complex ∆ as
(9) Shapley∆i (v) =
1
ri + 1
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
1
f |T |−1(Lk∆ i)
(v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
We note that if ∆ is a simplex, than f|T |−1 is precisely |T |!(n−|T |−1)!(n−1)! , and ri+1 = n; so Shapley
∆
i (v) =
Shapleyi(v) in the classical sense.
Let us recall a few relevant facts we will be useful for the main theorem in this section.
i) If I is a cone of cooperative game over a simplicial complex ∆ of rank r with pure links
fulfilling the symmetry axiom then without loss of generality we may assume that each link is
pure and has the same rank, precisely ri = r − 1 for all i ∈ [n], see Section 5.6.
ii) Let the group value φ be made by Shapley values in (9), and let ∆ be a Shapley simplicial
complex of vector s = (s0, . . . , sr−1), that is fk−1(Lk∆ i) = sk for all i ∈ [n], see Definition 5.11.
Then,
Shapley∆i (v) =
1
r
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
1
s|T |
(v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
iii) Moreover, we define a player j to be an extension for the coalition T if j can join T for the
cooperative game:
Ext(T ) = { j ∈ [n] \ T : T ∪ j ∈ ∆};
in addition, ext(T ) = |Ext(T )|.
Lemma 6.3. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex of rank r. Then, Ext(T ) = { j ∈ [n] : T ∈ Lk∆ j} and
ext(T ) = f0(Lk∆ T ).
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Proof. The statement follows directly from the definitions of extension of T , link of j and f -
vector. 
We are therefore ready to provide an axiomatic description of the Shapley values for simplicial
complexes.
Theorem E (Generalized Shapley’s Theorem). Let ∆ be a simplicial complex of rank r with pure
links and let I be a cone of cooperative games on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ for
the star St∆ i for every vertex i. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the permuted game pi · v is also in I
for every permutation pi in Symm(∆).
Let φ be a group value and assume that each φi satisfies the linearity axiom, the dummy
player axiom. Assume also that the group value fulfills the symmetric axiom with the further
constrain that every player enters the games with probability p0, that is there exists a solution
p = (p0, p1, . . . , pr−1) for the linear system n equations:
f(Lk∆ 1) · p = 1,
f(Lk∆ 2) · p = 1,
...
f(Lk∆ n) · p = 1,
where each equation has the form in (6).
Then, every individual value is the Shapley value in equation (9) if and only if ∆ is s-Shapley
with s = (s0, . . . , sr−1) and the group value satisfies the following efficiency scenario:
(10)
∑
i∈[n]
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Ft ∆
(
1
sr−1
)
v(F) +
1
r
∑
T∈∆,|T |<r
( |T |
s|T |−1
− ext(T )
s|T |
)
v(T ).
Proof. Using Theorem B, we can write each φi as
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T ))
and by using Theorem D we know that the real numbers piT depend only by the cardinality of
the set |T | = t, so
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
p|T | (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
If φi = Shapley∆i for every i, then p
i
t = 1/r ft−1(Lk∆ i); hence 1/r ft−1(Lk∆ i) = 1/r ft−1(Lk∆ j) for every
distinct pair of player and, then ∆ is s-Shapley with sk = fk−1(Lk∆ i).
By using Theorem 6.1, it is easy to see that if the group value φ is made of individual values
of the form (9), then
∑
i∈[n] Shapley∆i (v) is the number the one expressed in (10).
On the contrary direction, assume ∆ is s-Shapley and that (10) holds. As we mention right
before the statement of the theorem, (9) reduces to
Shapley∆i (v) =
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
1
r
1
s|T |
(v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
Consider the cooperative game 1T = vT − vˆT , so φi(1T ) = φi(vT − vˆT ). Hence, if F is a facet for
∆, then ∑
i∈[n]
φ∆i (1T ) =
∑
i∈F
p|F|−1,
19
Now, by hypothesis
∑
i∈F p|F|−1 = 1sr and so pr−1 = p|F|−1 =
1
r
1
sr
.
If T is not a facet then∑
i∈[n]
φ∆i (1T ) =
∑
i∈[n]
φ∆i (vT ) −
∑
i∈[n]
φ∆i (vˆT ) =
∑
i∈T
p|T |−1 −
∑
j∈Ext(T )
p|T |
and, therefore, by hypothesis
|T |p|T |−1 − ext(T )p|T | = 1r
( |T |
s|T |−1
− ext(T )
s|T |
)
.
Using that pr−1 = 1r
1
sr
, we recursively show that pt = 1r
1
st
. 
7. Decomposing the Shapley value
In this section, we are going to study when the Shapley value Shapley∆i can be written as
a weighted sum of classical Shapley values. Bilbao, Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n
[BDJLL01] characterized when individual values can be written as weighted sum of classical
Shapley values defined on the maximal facets of a matroids [BDJLL01]; the author has gener-
alized this result to simplicial complex in Theorem 5.1 of [Mar20a]. It is interesting to connect
these two axiomatizations.
To do this, let F be a facet of ∆ and we denote by ShapleyFi (v) the classical Shapley value for
the cooperative game v|F , that is a cooperative game on |F| players where v|F(S ) = v(S ) for any
subset S of F. Consider the following individual value
S∆i (v) =
∑
F∈Ft∆ i
cF ShapleyFi (v|F)
where {cF} is a subset of real numbers.
We start by substituting in the left hand side the expression (8):
S∆i (v) =
∑
F∈Ft∆ i
cF ShapleyFi (v|F)
=
∑
F∈Ft∆ i
cF
∑
T⊆F\i
1
|F|
|T |!(|F| − |T | − 1)!
(|F| − 1)! (v(T ∪ i) − v(T ))
=
∑
T∈Lk∆ i
 ∑
F∈Ft∆ T∪i
cF
 1|F| |T |!(|F| − |T | − 1)!(|F| − 1)! (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
Now we can compare the coefficient of (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) in the previous equation and the one in
the definition of Shapley∆i (v), see (9), and we assume they are equal:
1
rk Lk∆ i
1
f|T |−1(Lk∆ i)
=
 ∑
F∈Ft∆ T∪i
cF
 1|F| |T |!(|F| − |T | − 1)!(|F| − 1)!
and one gets:
(11)
∑
F∈Ft∆ T∪i
cF
rk Lk∆ i
|F|
f|T |−1(Lk∆ i)(|F|−1
|T |
) = 1
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Now, given the simplicial complex, the cardinality of the facets F, the rank of each link, the
binomial coefficient
(|F|−1
|T |
)
can be treated as constant terms and we denote
c˜F
def
= cF
rk St∆ i
|F|
(|F|−1
|T |
) .
Remark 7.1. The number cF is positive if and only if c˜F is positive.
Remark 7.2. Equation (11) shows two interesting factors:
• rk St∆ i|F| describing how far each link is to have the same rank of the full simplex; and
• f |T |−1(Lk∆ i)(|F|−1|T | ) that describes the discrepancy, level by level, from Lk∆ i and a full simplex of
the same rank.
Thus, we have obtained the following equation for every T ∈ Lk∆ i:∑
F∈Ft∆ T∪i
c˜F f|T |−1(Lk∆ i) = 1.
Theorem 7.3. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex of rank r and let I be a cone of cooperative game
defined on ∆.
Let S∆i (v) be individual value written as weighed sum of classical Shapley value, that is,
S∆i (v) =
∑
F∈Ft∆ i
cF ShapleyFi (v|F)
where cF is a real numbers, and where we denote by ShapleyFi (v) the classical Shapley value for
the cooperative game v|F for every facets F of ∆.
The Shapley value Shapley∆i (v) can be written as S
∆
i if and only if for every T ∈ Lk∆ i, there
exist a set of real numbers {c˜F}F∈Ft∆ T∪i such that∑
F∈Ft∆ T∪i
c˜F ft−1(Lk∆ i) = 1.
The coefficients cF are defined as
cF = c˜F
|F|
(|F|−1
|T |
)
rank St∆ i
.
Proof. One implication was already proven in the preparation of the theorem. The converse is
shown by reading back the chain of equality. 
Remark 7.4. If the cF’s are treated as probabilities, then we have the further constrains that∑
F∈Ft∆ i cF = 1 and cF ≥ 0.
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